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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1851, in an effort to promote shipbuilding and maritime invest-
ment,1 Congress codified a rule of maritime law dating back to "the
close of the middle ages . . . limit[ing] a shipowner's liability to the
* J.D. 1994, University of Richmond, The T.C. Williams School of Law; B.A.
1991, The College of William and Mary. The author is an associate with the Law
Offices of J. Thompson Shrader in Amherst, Virginia, and is grateful to Professor John
Paul Jones for his assistance and advice.
1. Norwich Co. v. Wright, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 104, 119-121 (1871).
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value of the vessel and its cargo. "2 The Shipowner's Limitation of Lia-
bility Act (SLLA)s was criticized almost immediately for the vague-
ness of its terms.' By 1954, even its underlying rationale was seriously
questioned, as the lot of the shipping industry improved and Congress
employed other methods for encouraging participation in shipbuilding.
With these changes, the question arose: What would it take for Con-
gress to repeal SLLA?
In 1975, Gilmore and Black predicted that "the pollution contro-
versy will in time lead to long overdue fundamental reconsideration of
the policy casually adopted more than a hundred years ago in our Lim-
itation Act."6 This prophecy came partially true fifteen years and nu-
merous oil spills later when Congress passed the Oil Pollution Act of
1990 (OPA 90).7 While not repealing SLLA, OPA 90 replaces its limi-
tation provisions for liability in federal oil spill actions, 8 and withdraws
the limitation protection it provided against liability in similar state ac-
tions.9 The fear of unlimited liability at the state level has generated
both criticism of OPA 90 and threats of trade-based retaliation against
the United States.10
2. Esta Later Charters, Inc. v. Ignacio, 875 F.2d 234, 235 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing
HUGO GROTIUs, DE JURE BELLI Ac PACIS 139 (Campbell trans. 1901)). See Walter
W. Eyer, Shipowners' Limitation of Liability - New Directions for an Old Doctrine,
16 STAN. L. REV. 370, 371 (1964).
3. 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 181 - 96 (1988).
4. Ignacio, 875 F.2d at 235-36 (citing GRANT GILMORE & CHARLES L. BLACK,
JR., THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY § 10-2, at 819 & n. 6 (2d ed. 1975)) (observing that
"[n]o one who has had occasion to study the Limitation of Liability Act has been
struck by its lucidity.") (emphasis added).
5. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Cushing, 347 U.S. 409, 437 (1954) (Black, J., dis-
senting). Justice Black was joined in his opinion by Chief Justice Warren, and Justices
Douglas and Minton. Id. at 427.
6. GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 4, § 10-4(b), at 825.
7. Pub. L. No. 101-380, 104 Stat. 484 (1990). The events leading to support of
the passage of OPA 90 included the Exxon Valdez oil spill in Prince William Sound,
the World Prodigy oil spill in the coastal waters of Rhode Island, and oil spills in the
Delaware River and the Houston Ship Channel. S. REP. No. 94, 101st Cong., 2d. Sess.
5 (1990), reported in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 723-24. The latter three incidents oc-
curred within twenty-four hours of each other. Id. at 723.
8. 33 U.S.C. § 2704 (Supp. III 1991).
9. Id. § 2718.
10. See, e.g., Leonard F. Alacatrana & Mary A. Cox, OPA 90 Certificates of
Financial Responsibility, 23 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 369 (1992); A.F. Bessemer Clark,
The U.S. Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 1991 LLOYD'S MAR. & COM. L.Q. 247; Paul S.
Edelman, The Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 8 PACE ENVTL. L. REy. 1 (1990); James A.
Hutchinson, Financial Responsibility Provisions: Are They Sinking the U.S. Maritime
Trade?, 24 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 223 (1992); Thomas J. Wagner, The Oil Pollu-
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However, SLLA is not the only limitation on a state's ability to
impose liability in the area of maritime law. State laws that "contra-
vene" the uniform maritime law of the United States may run afoul of
the U.S. Constitution." In maritime law, financial loss may be recov-
ered only if there is an attendant injury to property. 2 Although Con-
gress may alter this rule,'" it cannot delegate to the states its legislative
authority over admiralty in an effort to further national goals in that
area."'4 Clearly, a state-based scheme threatens the uniform nature of
the national maritime law.' 5
This article explores the viability of these defenses to state liability
laws authorized by OPA 90. Part II presents the basic liability provi-
sions of OPA 90 and the relevant role of state law. 6 Part III provides
examples of the myriad state liability schemes to which OPA 90 ex-
poses responsible parties and the resulting negative implications for the
uniform national maritime law.' 7 Part IV discusses the limitations that
a uniform national maritime law imposes on state laws and Congress'
incorporation of state laws in federal statutes.' 8 Part V analyzes
whether these defenses ought to succeed against actions under state
laws authorized by OPA 90, and concludes that Knickerbocker Ice Co.
v. Stewart 9 should be overruled to make Congress' authority to legis-
late in maritime matters consistent with the rest of its powers under the
commerce clause.2
II. THE OIL POLLUTION ACT OF 1990
A. Liability of Responsible Parties
Under OPA 90, a responsible party is liable for the damages and
tion Act of 1990: An Analysis, 21 J. MAR. L. & COM. 569 (1990).
11. Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 216 (1917).
12. See, e.g., IMTT-Gretna v. Robert E. Lee S.S., 993 F.2d 1193, 1195 (5th Cir.
1993); Kingston Shipping Co. v. Roberts, 667 F.2d 34 (lth Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
458 U.S. 1108 (1982).
13. See, e.g., In re Glacier Bay, 746 F. Supp. 1379, 1383 (D. Alaska 1990) ("Un-
less it is determined that TAPAA preempts the application of substantive maritime
law, maritime law applies regardless of the fact that plaintiffs did not invoke the proce-
dural benefits of admiralty jurisdiction.")
14. Washington v. W.C. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219, 226 (1924).
15. Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149, 164 (1920).
16. See infra notes 21-53 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 54-115 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 116-158 and accompanying text.
19. 253 U.S. 149 (1920).
20. See infra notes 159 - 219 and accompanying text.
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removal costs that result from a discharge of oil "into or upon the navi-
gable waters or adjoining shorelines or the exclusive economic zone."'2
Responsible parties include "any person owning, operating, or demise
chartering [a] vessel." 22 A responsible party may be liable for injuries
to natural resources, real or personal property, subsistence use, reve-
nues, profits and earning capacity, and public services. 23 Liability will
not attach where oil is discharged due to an act of God or war,2 or an
act or omission of a third party.25 A responsible party is not liable to a
claimant whose gross negligence or willful misconduct caused the dis-
charge of oil,2' as long as the responsible party reported the dis-
charge,27 and cooperated or assisted with the removal operations.28
B. Limitation of Liability
1. Federal
In general,29 OPA 90's federal provisions limit liability for com-
21. 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a) (Supp. III 1991). Navigable waters are "the waters of
the United States, including the territorial sea." Id. § 2701(21). The exclusive eco-
nomic zone was established by President Reagan in Proclamation No. 5030, 48 Fed.
Reg. 10605 (Mar. 14, 1983). 33 U.S.C. § 2701(8).
22. Id. § 2701(32)(A). "Responsible party" is defined somewhat differently for
onshore and offshore facilities, deepwater ports, and pipelines. Id. § 2701(32)(B)-(E).
Provisions are also made for determining the "responsible party" in the case of aban-
donment, id. § 2701(32)(F), and when a third party should be held liable. Id.
§ 2702(d).
23. Id. § 2702(b)(2).
24. Id. § 2703(a)(l)-(2).
25. Id. § 2703(a)(3). The third party must not be an "employee or agent of the
responsible party", and his or her act or omission usually must not occur "in connection
with any contractual relationship with the responsible party." Id. The responsible party
must have "exercised due care" regarding the oil spilled, and taken "precautions
against foreseeable acts or omissions of [the] third party." Id. § 2703(a)(3)(A) - (B).
26. Id. § 2703(b).
27. Id. § 2703(c)(1). The responsible party need not report the incident unless he
or she "knows or has reason to know" of the incident. Id.
28. Id. § 2703(c)(2). Cooperation and assistance need only be rendered at the
request of "a responsible official." Id. To avail himself or herself of this defense, a
responsible party must also comply with any "order issued under" § 1321(,;), (e), or
§9 1471 - 87. Id. § 2703(c)(3).
29. No limitation of liability is available where gross negligence, willful miscon-
duct, or a "violation of an applicable federal safety, construction, or operating regula-
tion" is involved. Id. § 2704(c)(1). Likewise, failure to meet the requirements listed
supra at notes 27 - 28 and accompanying text, will serve to remove any limitation on a
responsible party's liability. 33 U.S.C. § 2704(c)(2). Also, special liability rules apply
to Outer Continental Shelf facilities and vessels. Id. § 2704(c)(3).
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bined damages and removal costs to the greater of $1,200 per gross ton
or $10 million for tank vessels of more than 3,000 gross tons;30 $1,200
per gross ton or $2 million for tank vessels of 3,000 gross tons or less;-1
or the greater of $600 per gross ton or $500,000 for all other vessels.3 2
Certain responsible parties must "establish and maintain . . . evidence
of financial responsibility sufficient" to meet the maximum of the appli-
cable limitations detailed above. 83 Failure to do so allows the Secretary
of the Treasury to revoke the vessel's required clearance,, deny entry
to, detain, or seize the vessel. 5 Those providing evidence of financial
responsibility 6 are "guarantors" 7 and thereby may be sued directly
for any amounts for the liability of the guaranteed responsible party.38
2. State
OPA 90 does not truly guarantee that the liability of a responsible
party will be limited. The Act allows each state to enforce its own indi-
vidual liability schemes, which are neither limited nor preempted by
OPA 90 or SLLA.38 Specifically, a state can impose "additional liabil-
ity or requirements" exceeding that of OPA 90 regarding oil discharge
and pollution, and related removal costs.' 0 A state's ability to impose
30. Id. § 2704(a)(1)(A) - (B)(i).
31. Id. § 2704(a)(1)(A)-(B)(ii).
32. Id. § 2704(a)(2).
33. Those with "vessels over 300 gross tons (except ... non-self-propelled ves-
sel[s] ... not carry[ing] oil as cargo or fuel) using any place subject to the jurisdiction
of the United States," or "vessel[s] using the waters of the exclusive economic zone to
transship or lighter oil destined for a place subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States." Id. § 2716(a)(1),(2).
34. 33 U.S.C. § 2716(b)(1). Clearance is required by 46 U.S.C. app. § 91 (1988)
for a vessel "other than a licensed yacht or [certain] undocumented American pleasure
vessels" to depart the United States for a foreign port.
35. 33 U.S.C. § 2716(b)(2) - (3).
36. These include insurers, surety companies, or guarantors. Id. § 2716(e); 33
C.F.R. § 130.8(b)(1) - (2), (4) (1993).
37. 33 U.S.C. § 2701(13).
38. Id. § 2716(f). Guarantors have the same defenses available as the responsible
parties for whom they provide Certificates of Financial Responsibility. Id.
§ 2716(f)(1). See supra notes 24 - 28 and accompanying text. Furthermore, guaran-
tors have defenses arising from 33 U.S.C. § 2716(e), and are not liable for incidents
"caused by the willful misconduct of the responsible party." Id. § 2716(f)(2) - (3). A
guarantor's liability is limited to that amount required under OPA 90 for which he or
she provided evidence of financial responsibility. Id. § 2716(g). See supra notes 28 - 33
and accompanying text.
39. 33 U.S.C. § 2718(a), (c).
40. Id. § 2718(a).
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civil or criminal penalties is similarly unaffected by the Act."
Furthermore, OPA 90 removes SLLA's limitations imposed on
state regulation. 2 SLLA limits a shipowner's 43 general liability to its
interest in the "vessel and [its] freight then pending."" For bodily in-
jury and loss of life, a shipowner's liability under SLLA cannot exceed
the greater of his or her interest in the vessel and its freight or "$420
per ton of such vessel's tonnage.' 45 SLLA served to limit vessel owners'
liability for removal costs imposed by state and local governments.46
OPA 90 supersedes SLLA's regulation of both clean-up costs and dam-
ages.4 Indeed, the criticism voiced by courts that have applied the
SLLA spurred Congress to remove the act's limitations as a way to
achieve OPA 90's goal of a comprehensive package of international,
national, and state laws dealing with oil spills.' 8
While OPA 90 thus contributes to the uniformity of environmental
law,'49 it threatens the "general harmony and uniformity" 0 of national
maritime law. OPA 90 presents a limitation scheme for federal
claims, 51 a liability scheme the states are free to adopt.5  OPA 90 does
41. Id. § 2718(c).
42. Id. § 2718(a), (c).
43. Charterers manning, victualing, and navigating a "vessel at [their] own ex-
pense" are treated as shipowners. 46 U.S.C. app. § 186 (1988).
44. Id. § 183(a).
45. Id. § 183(b). This particular provision does not apply to "pleasure yachts,
tugs, towboats, towing vessels, tank vessels, fishing vessels or their tenders, self-pro-
pelled lighters, nondescript self-propelled vessels, canal boats, scows, car floats, barges,
lighters, and nondescript non-self-propelled vessels .... ." Id. § 183(f) (emphasis
added). However, there is no reason that in the absence of OPA 90, the other provi-
sions of SLLA should not apply to oil spills. See GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 4,
§ 10-4(b), at 825.
46. Butler v. Boston & Savannah Steamship Co., 130 U.S. 527, 557 (1889); Wil-
liam M. Ducan, The Oil Pollution Act of 1990"S Effect on the Shipowner's Limitation
of Liability Act, 5 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 303, 311 & n. 32 (1993) (citing Puerto Rico v.
S.S. Zoe Colocotroni, 628 F.2d 652, 665-66 (lst Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 912
(1981); Complaint of Harbor Towing Corp., 335 F.Supp. 1150, 1154-55 (D. Md.
1971)).
47. 33 U.S.C. § 2718 (a), (c) (Supp. III 1990).
48. See S. REP. No. 94, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1990), reported in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 725-26 (quoting Esta Later Charters, Inc. v. Ignacio, 875 F.2d 234,
235-36, 239 (9th Cir. 1989)).
49. See Michael J. Uda, The Oil Pollution Act of 1990: Is There a Bright Future
Beyond Valdez?, 10 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 403, 419-33 (1991) (noting that OPA 90 contrib-
utes clarity, efficiency, and a more comprehensive compensation mechanism to the pro-
cess of preventing and cleaning-up oil spills).
50. Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 216 (1917).
51. See supra notes 28 - 30 and accompanying text.
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not require the states to adopt the federal scheme, instead leaving it to
each state's legislature to decide whether its law will follow the federal
law. Furthermore, OPA 90 preserves plaintiffs' state law claims. The
elements of these state law claims may vary from state to state and
from claims available under federal law. Because OPA 90 removes the
SLLA limitation on these claims, SLLA can no longer guarantee that
responsible parties will be subjected to only one predictable judgement
regardless of the location of the damage caused by the spill."3
III. THE NIGHTMARE OF STATE LAW DIVERSITY
A. Recovery of Purely Economic Damages
1. In Admiralty Generally
A plaintiff in admiralty cannot recover tort damages for a purely
financial injury where there is no injury to his or her property.5 For
example, in Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint,55 a time charter
called for the vessel to be docked once every six months for repairs,56
during which time payment for the ship's use was to be suspended .5
After the charterer delivered the vessel to Robins Dry Dock to be re-
paired, the dry dock negligently damaged the vessel's propeller, delay-
ing the ship's return to service.5 8 The Supreme Court denied recovery
for loss of use during that time because the charterer had no property
interest in the vessel.59
52. S. REP. No. 94, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1990), reported in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 728.
53. See supra notes 44 - 46 and accompanying text.
54. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
55. 275 U.S. 303 (1927).
56. A time charter is a contract for the lease of a vessel for a specified time or use
under which the owner continues to operate the vessel, whose master and crew remain
servants of the owner. See, e.g., Atlantic Banana Co. v. M.V. "Calanca", 342 F.Supp.
447, 453 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
57. Robins, 275 U.S. at 307.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 308-09. This "bar against indirect recoveries has been widely applied in
maritime tort cases ... and has attracted criticism as a major barrier to oil spill plain-
tiffs in cases like the Exxon Valdez spill, although statutory exceptions sometimes ap-
ply." ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE,
LAW, AND SOCIETY 163 (1992) (citing Mulhern, Marine Pollution: A Tort Recovery
Standard for Pure Economic Losses, 18 ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 85 (1990)).
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2. In State Tort Law
Recovery for indirect, purely financial injuries has been imposed
for state law tort claims. For example, in Pruitt v. Allied Chemical
Corp.,60 the defendant sought to dismiss nine of the plaintiffs' twelve
counts for economic damages resulting from the discharge of the toxic
chemical Kepone into the James River and the consequent pollution of
the Chesapeake Bay.6 The plaintiffs claimed jurisdiction based on ad-
miralty, federal question, and diversity of citizenship. 62 They sought re-
lief in three counts based on state law causes of action in negligence
and products liability. 3 In one count, they sought relief based on the
law of admiralty.64 None of the plaintiffs suffered "direct, physical
damage" as a result of the discharge.65
The court dismissed the claim based on admiralty jurisdiction in
reliance upon Robins Dry Dock.6 Although considered by the court,6
Robins Dry Dock did not serve to prevent the plaintiffs from pursuing
their state law claims.68 The Virginia Supreme Court had not spoken to
the issue of purely economic damages.69 Since the case law from other
states was conflicting, the court fashioned its own theory.' 0 It noted
that even if Robins Dry Dock were controlling, commercial fishermen
could recover.7 While their damages were purely economic, these
plaintiffs had a constructive property interest in the fish they
harvested.' 2
If economic harm could be demonstrated, the lot of sport fisher-
60. 523 F.Supp. 975 (E.D. Va. 1981).
61. Id. at 976.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 976 - 77.
64. Id. at 980 - 81.
65. Id. at 976.
66. Id. at 981 - 82.
67. Id. at 977 & n. 7 (citing Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S.
303 (1927)).
68. Id. at 976 - 80. This conclusion seems strange since a plaintiff does not have to
base a claim on admiralty jurisdiction in order for the Robins Dry Dock limitation to
apply as long as the case generally sounds in admiralty. In re the Glacier Bay, 746
F.Supp. 1379, 1383 (D. Alaska 1990). In that case, plaintiffs' state law claims for
purely economic damages were cognizable only because the federal statute allowing
their recovery preempted Robins Dry Dock. Id. at 1383 - 88.
69. Pruitt, 523 F.Supp. at 977.
70. Id. at 977 - 78.
71. Indeed, the defendant did not seek to prevent recovery by these plaintiffs. Id.
at 978.
72. Id.
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men was not so different from that of commercial fishermen, even if the
former class of plaintiffs had no property interest in the bay's fish. 3
Therefore, the sport fishermen ought likewise recover."" Plaintiffs suf-
fering somewhat more indirect damages, namely boat, tackle and bait
shop, and marina owners, were allowed to recover as well.75 However,
the claims of "plaintiffs who purchased and marketed seafood from
commercial fishermen" were dismissed as being too remote." In the
end, the court drew a line, different from that drawn in Robins Dry
Dock but no less arbitrary, as to the recovery from purely economic
injury.77
3. In Admiralty After OPA 90
In contrast, OPA 90 authorizes the states to impose any additional
liability for oil spills. This authorization permits state legislators to al-
low recovery for non-Robins damages in admiralty.78 Allowing plain-
tiffs to bring state law claims against responsible parties for indirect,
purely financial injuries resulting from oil spills threatens the uniform-
ity of the general maritime law in two ways. First, in those states rec-
ognizing actions for non-Robins damages,7 9 a significant number of
new claimants will have a cause of action. An "oil spill foreseeably
harms not only ships, docks, piers, beaches, wildlife, and the like, that
are covered with oil, but also harms blockaded ships, marina
merchants, suppliers of those firms, the employees of marina businesses
and suppliers, the suppliers' suppliers, and so forth."80 Second, in such
73. Id. at 978 & n. 13. Sport fishermen admittedly would have a difficult time
proving such damages. Id. at 980 & n. 25.
74. Id. at 978.
75. Id. at 980.
76. Id.
77. "[E]ven the commentators most critical of the general rule [preventing recov-
ery of] indirect damages have acknowledged that some limitation to liability, even
when damages are foreseeable, is advisable." Id. at 979 - 80.
78. In re Oriental Republic Uruguay, 821 F.Supp. 950, 956 & n. 6 (D. Del.
1993); In the Matter of Ballard Shipping Co., 810 F.Supp. 359, 365 & n. 4 (D. R.I.
1993).
79. These states include Delaware, Rhode Island and Alaska. See In re Oriental
Republic Uruguay, 821 F.Supp. at 955 (applying DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 6207(a)(6)
(1991)); In the Matter of Ballard Shipping Co., 810 F.Supp. at 364 (applying R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 46-12.3 - 4 (1991)); In re the Glacier Bay, 746 F.Supp. 1379, 1386 - 88
(1990) (interpreting ALASKA STAT. §§ 46.03.822 - .828 (1984)).
80. Barber Lines A/S v. M/V Donau Maru, 764 F.2d 50, 54 (1st Cir. 1985). See
also Pruitt v. Allied Chemical Corp., 523 F.Supp. 975, 977 & n. 5 (E.D. Va. 1981)
(citing PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS, § 130 at 952 (1971)).
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states, "liability for pure financial harm [can be] vast, cumulative and
inherently unknowable in amount.""1 One result of the economic disin-
centive created by this unpredictability could be "insurance premiums
too expensive for the average [shipper]. '' 82
B. Limitation on Liability for Non-Robins Damages
Furthermore, the limitations on liability imposed by the various
states for direct injury is hardly uniform. For example, in North Caro-
lina, anyone "having control over oil" is liable without limit for injuries
to private property.8 3 In Texas,8' liability for property damages and
clean-up costs is limited to $1 million for vessels of 300 gross tons or
less not carrying oil as cargo; $5 million for vessels of 8,000 gross tons
or less; and $600 per gross tons for vessels over 8,000 gross tons (but in
no case more than $50 million).8 In contrast, federal law limits the
liability of an 8,000 gross ton vessel to only $10 million.8 6 Virginia lim-
its liability to $10 million for damages to public property, loss of tax
revenues and natural resources, as well as private claims. 8
Other states more closely follow the federal limitation on liability.
Louisiana claims to be the state most adversely affected by oil spills,88
but caps liability for "all damages and removal costs" at the greater of
$1,200 per gross ton or $10 million for tank vessels of more than 3,000
gross tons; the greater of $1,200 per gross ton or $2 million for tank
vessels of 3,000 gross tons or less; and the greater of $600 per gross ton
or $500,000 for all other vessels. 89 New York has set forth a liability
scheme identical to Louisiana's, though adding a charge of $300 per
gross ton for vessels not subject to OPA 90,90 but assuring that in no
case will liability exceed the federal limit.91
Some states refrain from any limitation of oil spill liability. 92 In
81. Barber Lines, 764 F.2d at 55.
82. Id.
83. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-215.93 (1990).
84. TEX. NAT. REs. CODE ANN. § 40.202(a)(2) (West Supp. 1993).
85. Id. §§ 40.151, .202(a)(1).
86. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. At $1,200 per gross ton, an 8,000
gross ton vessel would incur $9.6 million in liability. Since OPA 90 calls for the greater
of $10 million or $1,200 per gross ton for vessels of 3,000 gross tons or more, an 8,000
gross ton vessel would incur (at most) $10 million in federal liability.
87. VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.34:18.
88. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:2452(A) (West Supp. 1994).
89. Id. at § 30:2479(A)(1)-(2).
90. N.Y. NAv. LAW § 181(3)(a)(i) - (iii) (Consol. Supp. 1994).
91. Id. § 181(3)(b).
92. Ducan, supra note 46, at 312 & n. 40 (citing CAL. GOV'T CODE § 8670.56.6
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Maryland, for instance, liability is unlimited for damages to both the
State for clean-up and restoration costs, and private parties for injuries
to real and personal property.93 Other unlimited liability states include
California,94 Connecticut, 8 Rhode Island,96 South Carolina," Ore-
gon,9" and Washington.9"
This "new hodgepodge [of] one federal statute overlapping numer-
ous state provisions and general maritime law and common law reme-
dies" 100 fails to "prevent[] duplicative and inconsistent state laws and
remedies under the general maritime law and the common law." 10 1 For
example, OPA 90 authorizes the states to enforce the federal evidence
of financial responsibility provisions,102 but does not prevent state legis-
lators from adopting more stringent evidence of financial responsibility
requirements.103 If an unlimited liability state were to require evidence
of financial responsibility for all reasonably foreseeable removal costs
and damages, it could significantly hamper maritime commerce within
its jurisdiction: unlimited liability would render financial responsibility
incalculable to responsible parties and their guarantors.10' Even in un-
limited liability states that specify the amount of financial responsibil-
ity a responsible party must demonstrate, ultimate liability remains in-
calculable, rendering uncertain whether vessels entering their
jurisdictions are adequately insured. 08
The effects of OPA 90's assault on the uniformity of the general
maritime law could be disastrous. Insurance premiums "for tankers
calling in the United States" increased from ten to twenty percent soon
(West Supp. 1993); OR. REV. STAT. § 466.640 (1992); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 90.48.336 (1992)).
93. MD. CODE ANN., ENVIR. § 4-408, -409(a).
94. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 8670.56.5(a), 8670.56.6 (West Supp. 1994).
95. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-451(a) (West Supp. 1994).
96. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 46-12.5-7 (1991). Rhode Island imposes liability on re-
sponsible parties for any economic benefit they realize due to their discharge of oil! Id.
§ 46-12.5 - 7(a)(3).
97. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 48-43-820, -44-30(c) (Law. Co-op. 1987 & Supp.
1993).
98. OR. REV. STAT. § 466-640 (1992).
99. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 90:56.360, .370, .380 (West 1992).
100. Wagner, supra note 10, at 585.
101. Id.
102. 33 U.S.C. § 2719 (Supp. III 1991).
103. In fact, OPA 90 invites states to enact "additional liability or additional re-
quirements." Id. § 2718(c)(1).
104. Hutchinson, supra note 10, at 239.
105. See generally Alacatrana & Cox, supra note 10, at 369 (discussing the im-
plications of Certificates of Financial Responsibility and varying state requirements).
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after the Act was passed. 106 Such pressures may cause even insured
responsible parties to refrain from "committing their [vessels] to the
U.S. trade. ' 10 7 While pre-OPA 90 state statutes providing unlimited
shipowners' liability did not prevent "oil shipping and producing com-
panies [from being willing] to do business,"'' 1 these responsible parties
were shielded by the limitations imposed by SLLA. 0 9 The United
States is such an important market for international shipping compa-
nies that the global shipping industry may be affected by the uncer-
tainty in U.S. liability. 10
Additionally, insurance is a major source of funding for the recov-
ery of loss from oil spills."" State unlimited liability schemes that
render responsible parties unable to determine the necessary amount of
coverage may chase off this source of funding, leaving responsible par-
ties to pay on their own the amount of liability for which they were
uninsured."'
Even though OPA 90 and SLLA no longer prevent states from
imposing their own liability schemes on responsible parties," 3 constitu-
tional limitations on state regulation remain. Specifically, the states
cannot interfere with the general "harmony and uniformity" of the na-
tional maritime law. 1 " Furthermore, it is constitutionally impermissible
for Congress to incorporate state statutes into federal law if incorpora-
tion disrupts the consistency of maritime law.""
106. Edelman, supra note 10, at 21.
107. Clark, supra note 10, at 251. See Edelman, supra note 10, at 22 and Hutch-
inson, supra note 10, at 258 & n. 315 for lists of merchants who have refused to send
vessels to most or all United States ports as a result of OPA 90.
108. S. REP. No. 94, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1990), reported in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 728 - 29.
109. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
110. Hutchinson, supra note 10, at 258. When the United States market is de-
prived of significant amounts of oil, an oversupply may occur in other markets "[push-
ing] some owners and operators out of business" and depressing "freight rates . . .
putting some fleets, including U.S. companies, at a competitive disadvantage in the
world wide shipping market." Id.
111. Id. at 239.
112. Id.; Statement by Pres. G. Bush upon Signing HR. 1465, 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 861-1, 861-2 (Aug. 27, 1990). A new insurance company is being
formed to "cover for Oil Pollution Act (OPA) liabilities .... " New Insurance Com-
pany to Cover OPA '90 Pollution Liabilities, 10 LLOYD'S MAR. L. 5, 5 - 6 (1993).
However, "[i]nsurance would be for federal OPA requirements and would not extend
to liabilities imposed at state level." Id. at 6.
113. See supra notes 39 - 42 and accompanying text.
114. Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 216 (1917).
115. Washington v. W.C. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219, 228 (1924); Knicker-
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IV. THE UNIFORM NATIONAL MARITIME LAW
The Constitution gives the federal judiciary jurisdiction over "all.
admiralty and maritime" cases, 116 and Congress the authority "[t]o
make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into
execution the foregoing Powers and all other Powers vested by this
Constitution in the government of the United States, or in any Depart-
ment or Officer thereof."'117 Congress has given the United Stafes Dis-
trict Courts "exclusive original cognizance of all civil causes of admi-
ralty and maritime jurisdiction; ...saving to suitors in all cases, the
right of a common law remedy, where the common law is competent to
give it." 118
Congress thus has the ultimate authority to establish the national
maritime law.1" 9 Where Congress has not spoken, the national mari-
time law is that accepted by the federal courts. 120 This scheme ensures
the national uniformity and consistency that state legislation could not
provide.'
In Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen,12 the Supreme Court held that
the states may not pass laws interfering with the uniformity of national
maritime law. The Court's opinion in Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stew-
bocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149, 164 (1920).
116. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
117. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. Congress' power to make new maritime law stems in
part from its power to legislate in the context of interstate commerce. Id.; United
States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 404 (1940) (observing that
"[t]he power of the United States over its waters which are capable of use as interstate
highways arises from the commerce clause of the Constitution."); Gibbons v. Ogden,
22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1 (1824) (navigation is one aspect of commerce). But the grant of
admiralty jurisdiction to the federal judiciary also impliedly grants to Congress a power
of revising and supplementing the maritime law. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; Crowell v.
Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 55 (1956). The significance of this latter grant for legislation
such as OPA 90 is unclear, as Congress' power over navigable waters is plenary under
the "commerce" and "necessary and proper" clauses. See DAVID E. ENGDAHL, CON-
STITUTIONAL FEDERALISM 132 (2d. ed. 1987).
118. 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1988).
119. In re Garnett, 141 U.S. 1, 14 (1891) (state law in contravention of limited
liability for fire damages unconstitutional).
120. Butler v. Boston & Savannah Steamship Co., 130 U.S. 527, 556-57 (1889)
(noting that limited liability "has always been received as maritime law in this coun-
try" even before Congress acted). But in some areas, such as insurance, where there is
no established federal maritime law, state law is an acceptable source from which new
maritime law may be derived. Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S.
310 (1955).
121. The Lottowanna, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 558, 575 (1874).
122. 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
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art1 ' reveals that Congress may not delegate to the states the author-
ity to pass laws which might interfere with such uniformity. This bar-
rier was fortified in Washington v. W.C. Dawson & Co." 4 This line of
cases led to the passage of the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Com-
pensation Act. 2 But if Jensen and Knickerbocker Ice are followed,
then the OPA 90 authorization of recovery of non-Robins damages
under state liability law is unconstitutional.
In Jensen, a longshoreman was killed while unloading lumber from
a ship owned by Southern Pacific. 1 26 At that time, wrongful death was
not a cause of action recognized at maritime law. 2 7 Consequently, Jen-
sen's widow pursued a remedy under New York's Workmen's Compen-
sation Act. New York awarded the widow compensation under the
state act, 2 8 which required no proof of Southern Pacific's negligence
and did not consider Jensen's possible contributory negligence.12 9 Ships
could not "load or discharge ... cargo at a dock" in New York unless
they either paid a fine or complied with the state Workmen's Compen-
sation Act. 30
The Court found the New York law to conflict with the Constitu-
tion as the state had applied it to longshoremen.'Is First, the state law
was in contravention of a congressional policy "to encourage invest-
ments in ships.' 3 2 Furthermore, because the Workmen's Compensa-
tion remedy was wholly unknown to the common law, 33 Jensen's
widow was not entitled to the award under the saving to suitors
clause."3
When Congress amended the saving to suitors clause to preserve
"to claimants the rights and remedies under the workmen's compensa-
tion law of any state,""' 5 the Supreme Court held this action to be
unconstitutional."s 6 In Knickerbocker Ice, a bargeman drowned in the
123. 253 U.S. 149 (1920).
124. 264 U.S. 219 (1924).
125. 33 U.S.C. §§ 901 - 950.
126. 244 U.S. at 207-08.
127. The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199 (1886), overruled
by Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
128. 244 U.S. at 209.
129. Id. at 211.
130. Id. at 213 - 14.
131. Id. at 217-18.
132. Id.
133. Jensen, 244 U.S. at 218.
134. 28 U.S.C. § 1388 (1988). See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
135. Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149, 156 (1920).
136. Id. at 164.
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Hudson River while "doing work of a maritime nature. 13 7 Wrongful
death was still not a cause of action cognizable in maritime law.138 But
since Congress had attempted to extend each state's worker's compen-
sation law to maritime workers injured on its navigable waters,139 his
widow received an award under "the Workmen's Compensation Law of
New York. 140
The Court held that a maritime application of this law was still
unconstitutional because Congress could not delegate its legislative
power over maritime law to the states."" Disparate state maritime
laws, though sanctioned by Congress, would still destroy the harmony
and uniformity which the Constitution not only contemplated but actu-
ally established. If Congress could so act, there would have been no
point in granting it the "paramount power"' 43 over the national mari-
time law in the first place. 4
Subsequently, Congress further amended the Judiciary Act, "sav-
ing ... to claimants for compensation for injuries to or death of per-
sons other than the master or members of the crew of a vessel their
rights and remedies under the workmen's compensation law of any
State, District, Territory, or possession of the United States .... ,,145 In
W.C. Dawson & Co., the Supreme Court found this alteration likewise
unconstitutional. 4 The purpose of the act was obviously still to apply
state workmen's compensation laws "to injuries within the admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction substantially as provided by the Act of
1917.' ' 4 Congress could enact a national law compensating injured
maritime workers, 48 but could not use state law in contravention of the
Constitution's vision of a uniform national maritime law. 14 9
Whether the Jensen line of cases prevents a state from imposing
its own liability scheme for oil spills was at issue in Askew v. American
137. Id. at 155.
138. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
139. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
140. 253 U.S. at 155 - 56.
141. Id. at 164.
142. See Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 215 (1917).
143. Id.
144. Knickerbocker Ice, 253 U.S. at 164.
145. Act of June 10, 1922, c. 216, 42 Stat. 634 (quoted in Washington v. W.C.
Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219, 221, n.1 (1924)).
146. Id. at 223.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 227.
149. Id. at 228.
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Waterways Operators, Inc.150 In Askew, the plaintiffs sought to enjoin
the state of Florida from enforcing a state law imposing liability on
responsible parties for clean-up costs associated with oil spills in its ter-
ritorial waters, and "other damage incurred by the state and for dam-
ages resulting from injury to others." 151 The Supreme Court held that
those provisions allowing federal recoupment of clean-up costs in the
federal Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970 did not prevent a
state from devising its own method of recovering clean-up costs. 52
Like OPA 90,151 the federal Act explicitly left a state free to "im-
pose[ing] any requirement or liability with respect to the discharge of
oil into any waters within such State.1'6 4 The Court found that a
state's ability to enforce laws such as Florida's is not diminished by
Jensen and Knickerbocker Ice.1 51 Those cases apply "to suits relating
to the relationship of vessels, plying the high seas and our navigable
waters, and to their crews."'"8 In that context, states do not have the
authority, and Congress cannot confer upon them the authority, to im-
pose regulation.1 57 But for sea-to-shore injuries, a state's law can apply
as a valid exercise of its police power. 158
V. CONCLUSION
A. OPA 90 Must Meet Knickerbocker Ice Head On
1. Askew Inapplicable
Askew will not prevent the state liability provisions of OPA 90
from colliding with Jensen and its progeny, mainly because the general
harmony and uniformity of the national maritime law was not at stake
in Askew.16 9 Although the federal Act in Askew was similar to OPA 90
150. 411 U.S. 325 (1973).
151. Id. at 332 (quoting FLA. STAT. ANN. § 376.12 (West 1974)).
152. Id.
153. See supra notes 39 - 41 and accompanying text.
154. Askew, 411 U.S. at 329 (citing Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970
§ 1161(o)).
155. Id. at 337 - 44.
156. Id. at 344.
157. See Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149, 164 (1920); Southern
Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 216 (1917).
158. Askew, 411 U.S. at 343 - 44.
159. Id. at 332. "Whether the amount of costs [Florida] could recover from a
wrongdoer is limited to those specified in the Federal Act and whether in turn this new
Federal Act removes the pre-existing limitations of liability in the Limited Liability
Act are questions we need not reach here." Id.
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in that it imposed federal liability for cleanup costs on responsible par-
ties while preserving the states' ability to impose additional liability, 60
it did not explicitly rescind SLLA limitations on state law recoveries
like OPA 90.161 The removal of SLLA limitations on liability signifi-
cantly contributes to the unpredictability of liability for state law
claims.' 2 How the Askew court would have responded in the name of
Knickerbocker Ice to such a rescission is therefore unclear. In other
words, liability under the federal Act at issue in Askew simply was not
as unpredictable as it is under OPA 90.
Furthermore, the Florida law at issue mainly involved that state's
ability to recover its cleanup costs and damages. 163 Thus, the statute
imposed little threat of the "unpredictable number of plaintiffs" com-
plication of liability for purely economic injuries. 64 Even if one reads
the "shall be liable . . . for damages resulting from injury to others"
language of the Florida statute to create a private right of action, the
provision does not purport to create a cause of action for purely eco-
nomic injuries.1 65 Furthermore, Askew does not discuss the propensity
of the federal Act to allow liability for purely economic injuries under
state common law; in fact, Robins Dry Dock is not mentioned in the
opinion. True, the federal Act at issue in Askew dealt solely with
cleanup costs, so that a discussion of Robins was not particularly ap-
propriate; but this is one more reason why a court cannot look to
Askew alone to decide the applicability of Jensen and Knickerbocker
Ice in the context of OPA 90, which deals with damages as well as
cleanup costs. 66
2. Not a Maritime but Local Issue
Nor should OPA 90's allowance of liability under state law for
non-Robins damages due to oil spills avoid Jensen and Knickerbocker
Ice by posing as a maritime but local issue. The doctrine of maritime
but local is the logical "other side" of the Jensen coin: if state laws
which unjustifiably interfere with the uniformity of the national mari-
time law are unconstitutional, then those which do not interfere, or
160. Id. at 329.
161. See supra notes 42-48 and accompanying text.
162. See supra notes 83-112 and accompanying text.
163. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 376.12 (West 1974).
164. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
165. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 376.031 (West 1974). The statute does not define
"damages" or "injury." Id.
166. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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which do so justifiably, may be valid. 67 State laws serving a compelling
interest may be allowed to contravene the uniformity of the general
maritime law.16 8
In Slaven v. BP America, Inc.,169 the court allowed recovery of
purely economic damages based on state law causes of action out of a
concern that state law be uniform with the federal Trans Alaska Pipe-
line Authorization Act (TAPAA), which preempts Robins Dry Dock at
the federal level.17 0 In dicta, the court suggested that state laws impos-
ing liability for pure economic injuries were permissible as maritime
but local,17 1 observing that "California has a strong local interest in
regulating pollution within its borders, particularly oil spills affecting
its coastal waters. 1 7 2 Because "environmental regulation [generally]
has long been regarded by the [Supreme] Court as particularly suited
to local regulation,"' 7 3 the court presumably would entertain private
claims under state law for non-Robins damages.' 7 ' The precedential
value of this case for state law actions authorized by OPA 90 is ques-
tionable, however, because this latter rationale was not the basis of the
court's decision.
7 6
3. OPA 90 Does Not Preempt Robins
Similarly, an argument that OPA 90 preempts the general mari-
time law of damages as established in Robins should not prevent review
of that statute under the principles of Jensen and Knickerbocker Ice.
Congress may abrogate Robins Dry Dock by statute.1 7 6 In In re the
Glacier Bay17 7 the plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that purely
167. Even the Jensen court recognized that state regulation may permissibly re-
sult in some alteration of the general maritime law. Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244
U.S. 205, 216 (1917).
168. Slaven v. BP America, Inc., 786 F. Supp. 853, 863 (C.D. Cal. 1992). See
Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731 (1961).
169. 786 F. Supp. 853 (C.D. Cal. 1992).
170. Id. at 863.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 863.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Unlike TAPAA, which preempts Robins Dry Dock and SLLA, OPA 90
merely preempts SLLA. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
176. See, e.g., In re the Glacier Bay, 746 F. Supp. 1379, 1383 (D. Alaska 1990)
("Unless it is determined that TAPAA preempts the application of substantive mari-
time law, maritime law applies regardless of the fact that plaintiffs did not invoke the
procedural benefits of admiralty jurisdiction.").
177. 746 F. Supp. 1379 (D. Alaska 1990).
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economic damages are recoverable under a state statute, the Alaska
Environmental Conservation Act, and under TAPAA. 1 8 The court
held that TAPAA preempts SLLA179 and all other applicable maritime
law, including Robins Dry Dock.1 80 TAPAA imposes strict liability
"[n]otwithstanding the provisions of any other law, . . . for all damages
. . . sustained by any person" arising from spills of oil "transported
through the trans-Alaska pipeline [and] loaded on a vessel at the termi-
nal facilities of the pipeline .... "Is'
The court interpreted this language to mean that TAPAA
preempts not only all other statutory law, but all other applicable law
from any source, including general maritime law.1 82 TAPAA does not
define what "damages" are recoverable by "any person", but the stat-
ute's scope is so broad as to incorporate non-Robins damages by refer;-
ring to "all damages."18 Furthermore, like OPA 90, "TAPAA clearly
encouraged state legislation regarding liability for . . . oil spills."' '
Therefore, TAPAA did not preempt the Alaska act allowing for the
recovery of purely economic damages. 185 Robins Dry Dock did not pre-
empt such a recovery under state law because preemption under that
case would not be uniform with the liability scheme created viz.
TAPAA. 186
But OPA 90 defines "damages" so that under that law, at the fed-
eral level, a plaintiff can only recover for economic injuries "due to the
injury, destruction, or loss of real property, personal property, or natu-
ral resources. 1 87 Furthermore, damages recovered at the federal level
under OPA 90 are limited to those defined in the Act. 88 Thus, a Gla-
cier Bay analysis would not keep a reviewing court from applying Jen-
sen and Knickerbocker Ice to a state law permitting recovery for purely
economic injuries as authorized by OPA 90.
B. The Constitutional Fate of OPA 90
It seems inevitable that a court will have to address the issue of
178. Id. at 1382.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 1382 - 86.
181. Id. at 1384 (quoting 43 U.S.C. § 1653(c)(1)).
182. Id. at 1384 - 86.
183. Id. at 1385.
184. Id. at 1387.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 1387 - 88.
187. 33 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(2)(E) (1988 & Supp. III).
188. Id. § 2702(a).
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whether OPA 90's authorization for recovery under state liability laws,
to the extent it permits state law claims for non-Robins damages, is
constitutional per Knickerbocker Ice and W.C. Dawson & Co. The
threat posed by these cases to this aspect of the Act is implicitly recog-
nized by its legislative history. There, OPA 90 is constantly character-
ized as not "affect[ing]" or "preempt[ing]"," 11 rather than delegating
the "authority"'' 90 of states to impose additional liability or require-
ments on responsible parties. OPA 90 is presented as simply "preserv-
ing the authority of any State to impose its own requirements or stan-
dards with respect to discharges of oil within that State."'91 So
characterized, the Act would probably survive scrutiny under Knicker-
bocker Ice and WC. Dawson & Co., as prior statutes containing such a
provision have withstood challenge.192
However, OPA 90 does more than just preserve any pre-existing
state authority to prevent and control oil spills; states now have new
authority to pass unlimited liability schemes permitting recovery for
non-Robins damages. 9" Thus, the Act can fairly be seen as delegating
to states the power to compose part of a national effort to prevent and
control oil spills.' A state defending its unlimited liability statute will
thus have to successfully persuade the Court to overrule or abandon
Knickerbocker Ice and W.C. Dawson & Co. This task will not be
difficult.
The Askew court, while not specifically addressing an issue like
that presented by OPA 90,195 nevertheless limited Knickerbocker Ice as
well as Jensen to "suits relating to the relationship of vessels, plying the
high seas and our navigable waters, and to their crews."' 96 This inter-
pretation leads to the current situation in which Congress may some-
189. 1990 U.S.C.A.A.N. 722, 740.
190. Id. at 739 - 40.
191. Id. at 799.
192. The statute under consideration in Askew provided that "nothing in this sec-
tion shall be construed as preempting any state or political subdivision thereof from
imposing any requirement or liability with respect to the discharge of oil into any wa-
ters within such state." Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325,
329 (1973).
193. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
194. See Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149, 164 (1920). "To say
that because Congress could have enacted a compensation act applicable to maritime
injuries, it could authorize the states to do as they might desire, is false reasoning"
because, in general, admiralty is an area of the law in which only Congress can legis-
late. Id.
195. See supra notes 159 - 166 and accompanying text.
196. Askew, 411 U.S. at 344.
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times delegate its authority, and sometimes not. The easiest solution to
this inconsistency would be to expressly overrule Knickerbocker Ice and
W.C. Dawson & Co.
Congress' inability to adopt by reference current or future state
laws is unique to admiralty. The Court once flirted with the idea that
the national uniformity demanded by the Commerce Clause1 97 pre-
vented Congress from incorporating future state laws into its legisla-
tion.198 However, in In re Rahrer,"' the Court upheld a federal law
that allowed the law of a state into which liquor was imported to gov-
ern the product's traffic within that state. 00 Such state laws are invalid
in the absence of Congressional action, because the interstate transport
of liquor must be governed by uniform rules under the Commerce
Clause.2"" But Congress does not act unconstitutionally in an area of
interstate commerce over which it has exclusive control by removing
the barrier of uniformity to state laws affecting that area.20 2 This re-
moval can occur via statutory authorization of such state laws.203 Con-
gress lifted just such a barrier in OPA 90 when it authorized states to
pass unlimited liability laws.
National uniformity of the law is no less important in the area of
interstate commerce than in admiralty. 04 States generally may not in-
terfere with "the free flow of interstate commerce and its freedom from
local restraints in matters requiring uniformity of regulation. 2 5 How-
ever, Congress may "permit the states to regulate the commerce in a
197. U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl. 3.
198. Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 321 (1851). Where an
area of the law is exclusively the province of Congress, "it may be doubted whether
Congress could, with propriety, recognize [state laws] as laws, and adopt them as its
own acts." Id. Sometimes, Congress has the exclusive power to govern interstate com-
merce (i.e., where the subject of regulation is national in nature, or "admit[s] only of
one uniform system, or plan of regulation.") Id. at 319 (emphasis added).
199. 140 U.S. 545 (1891).
200. Id. at 560.
201. Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100, 109 - 10 (1890). A state in the exercise of its
police power, cannot inhibit the import of a commodity protected by the need for uni-
form laws governing its traffic. Rahrer, 140 U.S. at 560.
202. Id. at 564. This is not a delegation of national legislative power to the states.
Rather, state laws passed under Congressional authorization are as binding on the citi-
zens of that state as anyone entering the state. At the same time, they do not bind
anyone acting outside of the state. See United States v. Sharpnack, 355 U.S. 286, 294
(1957).
203. See Rahrer, 140 U.S. at 564.
204. Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 216 - 17 (1917).
205. Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 770 (1945).
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manner which would otherwise not be permissible. ' 20 6 In other words,
Congress can authorize state regulation creating nonuniformity in the
law of interstate commerce. 0 Why should the situation be any differ-
ent in admiralty?
As an initial matter, Congress can legislate in the area of inter-
state commerce through a direct constitutional grant of authority. 08 By
negative implication, state legislation burdening interstate commerce is
unconstitutional. 0 9 Congress can authorize such legislation because the
direct constitutional grant of power means Congress has "the final au-
thority for determining the way in which interstate commerce is
regulated. 210
By contrast, the only direct constitutional grant of authority re-
garding admiralty is to the federal judiciary.' The Supreme Court
has used this power to apply and develop the substantive law "inherent
in the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.121 2 Such power might im-
ply that the Court has the final say on how admiralty may be regu-
lated, making Knickerbocker Ice more appropriate in maritime matters
than in the interstate commerce context. 1 But the Court seemed to
relinquish "final say" authority over admiralty law in Crowell v. Ben-
son,214 in which it held that the direct constitutional grant of authority
to the federal judiciary over maritime cases contained an indirect con-
stitutional grant of authority to Congress to revise and supplement the
maritime law.21 5
Furthermore, one may fairly characterize the indirect, Article III
grant of authority to Congress over maritime law as superfluous. Con-
gress seems to have plenary power over the navigable waters of the
United States as part of its direct constitutional grant of authority to
206. Id. at 769.
207. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 8.5, at
281 (4th ed. 1991).
208. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
209. JEROME A. BARRON ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICY
172 & n. 1 (3d ed. 1987).
210. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 207, at 281.
211. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
212. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 55 (1932).
213. Since Congress has been entrusted with regulating interstate commerce, the
appropriateness of judicial fact-finding to overturn state laws as unconstitutionally bur-
dening interstate commerce has been questioned. See Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex
rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 795 (1945) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
214. 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
215. Id. at 55.
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regulate interstate commerce."' As a result, there is nothing left for
the Court to exercise any "final say" authority over when Congress acts
as it did in passing OPA 90, which deals specifically with oil spills in
"navigable waters." 1
Interstate commerce and admiralty are thus closely akin with re-
spect to the necessity of uniformity, and the exclusiveness of federal
control over them.218 Therefore, because the Court chose not to adopt
reasoning similar to Rahrer in Knickerbocker Ice, the latter opinion
has been described as "old" and "poorly reasoned." 1 9 As environmen-
tal concerns served as a catalyst for reevaluating SLLA, perhaps the
Court will now reconsider Jensen, Knickerbocker Ice and W.C. Dawson
&Co.
216. ENGDAHL, supra note 117, at 132. If the commerce clause only empowered
Congress to regulate navigation, Congress could not "regulate the discharge into [navi-
gable] waters of wastes that could not interfere with navigation." Id. at 129. However,
Congress' authority under the commerce clause is not limited to navigation but extends
to navigable waters themselves. See United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311
U.S. 377, 404 (1940) (stating that "Itihe power of the United States over its waters
which are capable of use as interstate highways arises from the commerce clause of the
Constitution.") As a result, "the objective at which a particular regulation of navigable
waters is aimed becomes immaterial to the question of constitutional validity." ENG-
DAHL, supra note 117, at 130.
217. See 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a) (Supp. III 1991).
218. Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 216-17 (1917).
219. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 207, at 280, n. 1.
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